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We propose the concept of a Dong World, a mountainous territory lying south of the Yangzi 
valley and north of the lowlands of mainland Southeast Asia. In the highland valleys (dong) 
across this rugged terrain with its upland peoples, there emerged multiple communities based on 
wet rice agriculture and led by their chieftains. Much local rivalry, as well as conflict with more 
distant external powers, resulted among these chieftains. Using archaeological studies, Chinese 
texts, and other recent texts, we follow the history of the Dong World from the early last 
millennium BCE to the present day. We also establish a distinct periodization in this world's 
development. After the dominance of the Nanzhao realm (seventh-ninth centuries CE) and of 
Dali (tenth to thirteenth centuries), came the Mongol invasions and Ming (1368-1644) 
dominance, which split this world into its northern (Chinese) and southern (Southeast Asian) 
sectors. Since the early eighteenth century, lowland states (China, Burma, Thailand, and 
Vietnam) have carved out their pieces of this world, first with indirect rule (for China, tusi) 
before switching to direct rule (for China, gaitu guiliu) where possible. The result today is a 
world increasingly forced to cope with and benefit from external political and economic 
demands. The inhabitants of the dong communities are also in the process of accepting, rejecting, 
and/or accommodating these demands. 
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ABSTRACT 
We propose the concept of a Dong World, a mountainous territory 
lying south of the Yangzi valley and north of the lowlands of mainland 
Southeast Asia. In the highland valleys (dong) across this rugged 
terrain with its upland peoples, there emerged multiple communities 
based on wet rice agriculture and led by their chieftains. Much local 
rivalry, as well as conflict with more distant external powers, resulted 
among these chieftains. Using archaeological studies, Chinese texts, 
and other recent texts, we follow the history of the Dong World from 
the early last millennium BCE to the present day. We also establish a 
distinct periodization in this world's development. After the 
dominance of the Nanzhao realm (seventh-ninth centuries CE) and of 
Dali (tenth to thirteenth centuries), came the Mongol invasions and 
Ming (1368-1644) dominance, which split this world into its northern 
(Chinese) and southern (Southeast Asian) sectors. Since the early 
eighteenth century, lowland states (China, Burma, Thailand, and 
Vietnam) have carved out their pieces of this world, first with indirect 
rule (for China, tusi) before switching to direct rule (for China, gaitu 
guiliu) where possible. The result today is a world increasingly forced 
to cope with and benefit from external political and economic demands. 
The inhabitants of the dong communities are also in the process of 
accepting, rejecting, and/or accommodating these demands.  
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1 This proposal is derived from our work in Anderson and Whitmore (2015). 
Our great thanks go to four anonymous reviewers who helped us sharpen 
the focus of our concept and to a close reading by Henry Wright. We have 
incorporated their thoughts into our investigations. 
Anderson, James A and John K Whitmore. 2017. The Dong World: A 
Proposal for Analyzing the Highlands Between the Yangzi Valley and  
the Southeast Asian Lowlands. Asian Highlands Perspectives 44:8-71. 




Many scholars and others have dealt with a multitude of parts within 
the mountainous region lying between the Yangzi Valley and the 
lowlands of mainland Southeast Asia, but few have considered the 
whole.1 We join Jean Michaud (2006:149) in believing that "… all these 
different segments [of this mountain region] could be reconnected to 
form a meaningful, though far from uniform, physical, historical, 
social, and cultural space." While, as he himself noted (McKinnon and 
Michaud 2000:2), "only the fool" would try such an endeavor, what we 
wish to suggest is a "meta" approach in which we conceive of this 
highland world, spanning what is commonly perceived by the modern 
world as divided between China and Southeast Asia, instead as a single 
physical, socio-cultural, and political entity. Ours is not an effort to join 
any particular discourse (others may do that), but to construct from 
the ground up a specific concept for this particular region. This 
proposal is meant to be an abstracted sketch of the region as derived 
initially from the essays in our edited volume, China's Encounters on 
the South and Southwest (Anderson and Whitmore 2015). The latter 
contains the specifics from which our concept arose. As a sketch, this 
essay is not meant to be all-inclusive (such requires another book), and 
we hope others will help us fill out the world we are describing. 
This world has existed into the modern age and has only in 
recent centuries begun to be pulled apart by the expanding lowland 
state forces of surrounding nations. By treating this world as 
                                                          
1 Other designations for the entire mountain region and beyond include 
Zomia, Southeast Asian Massif, and Indo-Chinese massif. Zomia, employed 
by James C Scott (2009; 2016), has engendered much discussion over its 
external statist orientation, and we are content to leave it to that broader 
discourse. As for the Southeast Asian Massif, put forward by Jean Michaud 
(Michaud 2000; 2006; 2009; Forsyth and Michaud 2011; Turner et al. 
2015), we believe, first, that it relates to a generalized physical description of 
the land, where our proposed concept is socio-political as well as physical; 
and, second, that this region is not part of Southeast Asia, but a separate 
entity, active in its own right and apart from, but influencing and influenced 
by both China and Southeast Asia. We feel that this term disregards the 
precise terrain characteristics of this region, as well as the deep historical 
connections between this region and dominant lowland peoples. This 
critique also holds for the Indo-Chinese massif (Robinne and Sadan 2007). 




fundamentally autonomous and pursuing its own agency vis-à-vis the 
encroaching lowland forces, we gain a better perception of the actors 
involved and their shifting intentions. Pursuing the great variety of 
local agents within this world as they dealt with their immediate 
neighbors as well as with their distant antagonists, we see the 
contingencies and the personalities that have helped shape this world 
we know today. In this, we follow Hjorleifur Jonsson's (2014:24) call 
for the recognition of "negotiation and the mutual reliance or benefit" 
among these groups. 
In this paper, we present our concept of the Dong World, that 
highlands area stretching from the Yangzi Valley to the Southeast 
Asian lowlands, from the hills of southeast coastal China to the eastern 
edges of the Tibetan Plateau.1 This territory, centered on the Nanzhao/ 
Dali/Yunnan Plateau, beneath the upland slopes, is made up of 
highland river valleys and the communities that live within them. In 
Tai languages, such a valley is a djong; which Catherine Churchman 
(2016:100) describes as "a mountain valley or level ground between 
cliffs beside a stream." Eventually seen by the Chinese as a political 
unit, the term became sinicized as dong 'mountain valley community' 
(often mistranslated as 'grotto/cave') with its chieftain.2 We choose 
this Tai/Chinese term for this world, given how it reflects the core 
nature of the region. Herein we ask: What was its physical nature? 
                                                          
1 We first developed this concept in Anderson and Whitmore (2015:14-19). 
Yao (2016:111-112) and Michaud (2006:5) also discuss this region and 
include the Sichuan territory. Michaud goes farther south in Southeast Asia 
as well. 
2 For a discussion of the meaning of the term dong, see Churchman 
(2015:65, nn 19-20) and Baldanza (2015:171-172, nn 10-11); see also 
Baldanza (2016:122-123); Churchman (2016:100, 118, nn 1-2); Hargett 
(2010 [1170s]:li-lii); and Faure 2007:46-47). In the western Tibeto-Burman 
regions of the Dong World, the term for such "intramontane basins" is bazi; 
see Yao (2016:7-8); Harrell (2001:61); Wang (1997:41-42); and Yang 
(1997:270-71). Yang (2008:25-26, 148, 151, http://www.gutenberg-
e.org/yang/, accessed 16 July 2016) speaks of "small fertile basins and 
valleys." Perhaps related to djong/dong is the eastern Zhuang ethnonym 
cuengh/tsuengh (Holm 2003:8-11, map p 10). The latter term appears in a 
region of early Han contact and may have been sinicized to dong. 




Who were the peoples within it? What socio-economic pattern did 
these peoples develop? How did their political form come about? How 
did local power interact with external, particularly state, power?   
 
 
MOUNTAINS AND STREAMS 
 
The physical nature of this world emerged when the Indian 
subcontinent collided with the Eurasian landmass causing the great 
uplift of the Tibetan Plateau.1 On the eastern edge of this high plateau, 
the highlands descend in a step-down fashion all the way to what 
became the southeast coast of China. In height, this territory slopes 
down from the peak of Mt. Everest to sea level, the Yunnan-Guizhou 
Plateau descends west-to-east from 7,000 feet to 4,000 and then on 
down to the coastal plains. Water and its flow have carved these 
heights into a series of river valleys and ridges, created by tectonic 
block faulting, to the east and the south, though only about one-tenth 
of this terrain is plateau/basin (dong) land. The streams here include 
the great rivers of the Yangzi, the Red (Hồng), the Mekong, the 
Salween, and the Irrawaddy, with numerous other streams in the 
watersheds amid these major rivers.2 
 Robert Marks (1998:24-44, 46-47, 52) describes the Lingnan 
'South of the Passes' region on the east (downstream) of the Dong 
World as an area of limestone raised by the tectonic uplift to its west, 
forming an east-west mountain range that lies between the Guizhou 
Plateau and the Guangxi Basin. On the south are mountains that lead 
to present-day Vietnam, enclosing the Basin at a height of about 1,000 
feet. The Basin's western edge rises sharply up to the Yao Hills and the 
Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau. With the plentiful monsoon rains in the 
summer months, streams have carved their paths sharply through the 
                                                          
1 Indian Uplift (2015); Molnar (2015:89-105); Molnar and Stock (2009:1-11, 
figs 1-2); and Sigley (2016:184-186). Also see the map in Yao (2016:109). 
2 Miller (1994a:[2]-4); Higham (1996:137, map 5.1). For a look at ridges and 
valleys of the Dong World from the perspective of the highest eastern 
Himalayan peak (within northern Myanmar), see Jenkins (2015:60-91).  




mountainous terrain. The upland valleys (dong) receive plentiful water 
both from the skies and from upstream. The flows change dramatically 
throughout the year and between years, cutting into this terrain. The 
result has been the valley (dong) lands scattered among the ridges. 
Travel, by both land and water, required patience and effort, and 
depended on the time of year. Seasonal flooding deposited silt into 
these limited valley spaces, creating fertile soil therein. Surrounded by 
thick forests on the slopes, these dong were rich pockets of agricultural 
land separated by the steep upland ridges with their great variety of 
flourishing flora and fauna. 
 Here, the streams worked their way through the limestone 
regions, creating the spectacular karst topography and the mountain 
valleys, the dong.1 We are led, in the words of Mark Elvin (2004:216), 
"… into a subtropical labyrinth of mountains and plunging river valleys. 
Snakes, monkeys, tigers, deer, and many other animals and birds 
flourished in its forests." 2  To the south, one goes down the Great 
Descent (in Marco Polo's phrase) into the territory of the southwest 
monsoon, much warmer and wetter than up on the Plateau. As Rhoads 
Murphey (1994:62) noted from his time in Yunnan during the 1940s: 
 
… one entered the monsoon rain forest, … a new kind of world …, through 
torrential downpours, oceans of mud, and almost frighteningly luxurious 
vegetation at all levels, … wild orchids, plus occasional elephants and 
tigers.  
 
Within the highland river valleys stretching off the Plateau, to both the 
east and the south, there emerged the agricultural communities of the 
dong that form the center of our proposed narrative. Above them, on 
the upland mountain slopes there existed other communities that 
                                                          
1 The Zhuang on the eastern edge of the Dong World differentiate among 
large valleys, small valleys, and tiny karst hollows (Holm 2003:13). 
2 See also Weinstein (2014:15). These four animals are the remnants of a 
much different fauna (including elephants, wild water buffalo, apes such as 
gibbons and larger primates, and giant pandas) that disappeared by the 
second millennium CE (Henry Wright, personal communication, 11 
November 2016). 




interacted, economically, socially, culturally, and politically, with those 
in the mountain valleys (See Fig. 1).  
 
 
DONG 'MOUNTAIN VALLEY COMMUNITIES' 
 
Speaking in general terms, the original ethno-linguistic pattern of the 
Dong World seems to have taken this form: on its western side, Tibeto-
Burman; on its north, Miao-Yao (Hmong-Mien); on its east, in the Yue 
world of the Chinese, the Tai; and on the south, Mon-Khmer (such as 
the Wa). Through the centuries, the latter seem to have remained fairly 
stationary. At the same time, elements of the other three groups were 
in motion (possibly due to Chinese pressures from the north) as the 
Tibeto-Burmans moved south and southwest (some going down into 
the lowlands that would become Burma/Myanmar); the Miao-Yao 
moved south (eventually some into the high mountains of present-day 
northern mainland Southeast Asia); and the Tai pushed southwest and 
west (through northern Vietnam into areas of today's Yunnan, Laos, 
Thailand, Myanmar, and Assam).1 Overall, we believe that it has been 
not culture (ethnicity), but adaptation to ecology that has mattered in 
the Dong World. Yet, over the first millennium CE, it appears that 
Tibeto-Burman groups were most active and powerful, while Tai 
communities took the upper hand from the beginning of the second 
millennium. The Mongol incursion, followed by the Ming, tamped 
down an already weakened Tibeto-Burman presence and kept the Tai 
forces on their southern fringe (from the Gulf of Tonkin to the 
Brahmaputra River). In this way, the Dong World resembles Inner 
                                                          
1 Taken from Miller (1994b:265-292), especially the map on p. 271; Turner et 
al. (2015:21, map 2.1); Harrell (2001:62-71, 177); Swope (2011:113, map 6); 
Marks (1998:53-55); McKinnon and Michaud (2000:2-5 maps); Turner et 
al. (2015:21 map). Bellwood and Glover (2004:5 map, 9, 11); Bellwood 
(2004:21-22 map, 24-25); Higham (2004:41-53); Holm (2003:159-160); 
Gedney (1995); Wang (1997:45-57); and Lee (2015:64-66) are the sources 
from which the ethnographic information above was obtained. For mid-
twentieth century descriptions of these ethno-linguistic groups, see LeBar et 
al. (1964). 




Asia, as its peoples and their wet rice agriculture have moved 
aggressively out of their environmental zone and into (and had major 
impacts on) the lowland territories along its flanks, particularly to the 
south. Like the "conquest dynasties" in China coming out of Inner Asia, 
descendants of political powers from the Dong World would become 
rulers in Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam.  
As indicated above, within this mountain world the stream 
valleys (dong) form only a small percentage of its land mass, perhaps 
a tenth. The remainder of this world consists of the mountain slopes 
themselves. On these forested upland slopes, there are (and have been) 
a great variety of ethnic peoples living predominantly above the stream 
valleys. These upland peoples and those in the valleys have continued 
to interact through the centuries, economically, socially, culturally, 
and politically. Since we consider (and the records reflect) the dong as 
the hubs of these activities, our concept emphasizes these valleys, 
hence adopting this indigenous term as its name. Where possible, we 
speak of these upland peoples in relation to the dong. We do not 
consider there to have been a hard line between these peoples, but take 
an "interactionist" approach (Evrard 2007:159), as Edmund Leach 
(1954) did, believing that there existed a socio-cultural permeability 
and flexibility of the peoples above and within the dong contingent in 
certain circumstances.1  Overall, the complex dynamics between the 
uplands and the dong need to be examined further. Wang (1997:42) 
has commented for western Yunnan that "The valleys are rich, the hills 
are poor, and the differentiation is increasing." 
 As we examine the socio-economic (this section) and political 
(next section) situations within the Dong World, we begin with 
archaeological evidence from the prehistoric period2 before moving to 
Chinese texts. These texts are specifically Li Daoyuan's (d. 527) Shui 
jing zhu 'Commentary on the Water Classic' of the sixth century CE, 
Fan Chuo's Man shu 'Book of the Southern Barbarians' of the 860s, 
                                                          
1 For discussions of Leach's work, see Wang (1997:11-34) and Robinne and 
Sadan (2007). 
2 Yao (2016). 




and the writings of Fan Chengda and Zhou Qufei in the 1170s.1 Thus, 
starting with an interior material view from the excavations, we utilize 
external texts to understand the human nature of the Dong World. The 
authors of these texts each had contact with the peoples they described. 
The commentator of the Shui jing zhu reflects the minimal contact of 
the post-Han2 era in the far southwest where Fan Chuo served in the 
southern Tang3 Protectorate of Annan (the Red [Hồng] River delta) 
during the western Nanzhao invasions of the 860s and where Fan 
Chengda and Zhou Qufei were provincial officials in the Song 4 
southern province of Guangxi amongst the eastern dong communities 
during the 1170s.  
In the last millennium BCE, the mountain valleys of the Dong 
World saw communities form along its streams and up its slopes. The 
plateau beyond Chengdu in modern-day Sichuan would become the 
cultural and political center of the Shu Kingdom, the eastern riverine 
valley region surrounding modern-day Chongqing would be the center 
of the Ba Kingdom, and the areas to the northwest and south of these 
centers would be the lands of the xinan yi 'southwestern barbarians'.5 
As Alice Yao describes these latter valleys, they had four zones: the 
flood plains of the streams, lower terraces and foothills, upland slopes, 
and side valleys. Through these centuries, the dong communities grew 
rice on the valley floors, up the slopes, and in the side valleys. Their 
graves had meat, grain, and liquid containers. The degree of their 
prosperity and power would have depended mainly on the space, large 
or small, accessible for agriculture.6 They would also have developed 
exchange relations with peoples higher up the slopes and in adjacent, 
and eventually distant, valleys. Excavations indicate significant 
populations during the period in at least some of the valleys, as 
                                                          
1 Taylor (1995), Li (1936 [6th c.]), Fan Ch'o (1961[860s]), and Fan Chengda 
(2010[1070s]). 
2 The Han Dynasty lasted from 206 BCE to 220 CE. 
3 The Tang Dynasty lasted from 618 CE to 907. 
4 The Song Dynasty lasted from 960 to 1279. 
5 He (2011:220). 
6 This can be seen in today's Zhuang conceptions of agriculture in the large 
and small valleys and the hollows (Holm 2003:15). 




interrelated settlements emerged in well-spaced patterns with social 
differentiation. As these varied communities took shape, based on the 
mound burials of their ancestors, leadership emerged and chiefdoms 
appeared with the development of power and authority. With the 
chiefdoms came territorial conflict that is well documented in the 
centuries after 700 BCE. In Yao's terms (2016:104), the "fertile basins 
and key communication corridors" through this mountainous terrain 
became prime zones for this competition as the communities' sense of 
themselves grew and consolidated. These dong settlements, in their 
local variety, show different patterns in the eastern, central, and 
western sectors of the Dong World.1 
Through the middle of this last millennium BCE, the pattern of 
local power and competition among the dong communities continued 
as they maintained their ritual burials, generation after generation. As 
Yao (2016:108) notes, "regional political processes" involving both 
exchange and strife took hold with the dong communities increasingly 
forming inter-valley networks. This led to the growth of trade links and 
the movement of prized objects along them and in particular, early 
bronze drums (with local design variations) signifying chiefly wealth 
and power.2 Valleys large and small across the Dong World witnessed 
this. In such a way, the dong communities proceeded to grow both 
agriculturally and through commerce; some more, some less 
depending on the size of their valleys and their proximity to the 
growing interregional trade routes, particularly north-south. This was, 
in Yao's (2016:126) terms, "a new expanding regional network 
connecting remote highlands in the upper Jinsha River (2,600-3,000 
meters above sea level) corridor to the low-lying alluvial valleys 
extending into [modern] Vietnam." She sees here (2016:129) what 
Edmund Leach (1954) saw in the Kachin Hills of Myanmar over sixty 
years ago, as Yao notes, "a simultaneous process of social segmentation 
                                                          
1 Yao (2016:ch 3). 
2 For the growing discussion of bronze drums, see Yao (2016:108-174 
passim, 226-230); Churchman (2011/2013:74-81; 2015:61-63, 67, 73-74; 
2016:ch 1 and passim), and Li (2011/2013:45-48). Sprenger (2007:166-168) 
and Holm (2003:15) provide excellent examples of recent bronze drum 
usage. 




and class stratification," as the burial mounds grew to be visible 
monuments. 
Out of this pattern rose the Dian society in the Kunming plain 
during the fifth and fourth centuries BCE as its widespread influences 
moved across the mountain valleys. The chiefs of these dong 
communities came to interact and to compete much more with each 
other as the scale of wealth and artifacts rose considerably and the 
regional pattern grew stronger. Cowries from the Bay of Bengal 
became part of this inter-valley system, and the manufacture of the 
drums proceeded to be more elaborate, as Yao (2016:138) says, "for 
display and narration." The new drum form spread throughout the 
Dong World, especially down the Red (Hồng) River. Agriculture and 
textile production (linked to women) formed the economic basis, as 
trade grew within the Dong World and beyond it.1 
With the initial entrance of the Chinese (Han Dynasty) political 
power into the Dong World over the third and second centuries BCE, 
the local dong communities acted to maintain their autonomy in the 
face of imperial demands and enticements. Economic penetration of 
the Dong World increased, and the Dian society of the Kunming plain 
showed ever-greater social differentiation. The horseman appeared as 
a marker of status and with him the raising of horses. In later centuries, 
horses would become the most important commodity to pass through 
the Dong World. Settlements continued to grow in the valleys and on 
their slopes, with the main ones lying along the streams in the center 
of the valleys. Artisans developed vigorously as iron working joined 
bronze. Overall, a distinct differentiation occurred among the dong 
communities depending on their resource control as well as between 
them and the upland peoples.2  
Han political control in the late second century BCE followed 
existing trade routes, and their bestowal of titles and seals defined the 
social and political structure of nearby dong societies in Han terms. 
Moving particularly into the eastern portion of the Dong World, the 
Han declared the region their province of Yizhou, while adapting their 
                                                          
1 Yao (2016:chs 4-5) and Higham (1996:chs 5, 9). 
2 Yao (2016:167-181). 




contact to, in Yao's (2016:182) words, "existing [indigenous] territories 
and networks … rel[ying] on local elites to negotiate cooperation 
among native subjects…" This meant that local societies allied 
themselves with the newly intrusive power where they did not actively 
resist it. Over the last century BCE, Han military strength subdued 
such outbreaks. Still the indigenous social structure remained, both 
affected by Han pressures and relied upon by the Chinese in their 
efforts at controlling them. As seen in Han coins and brick tombs, 
communities of the Dong World, in dealing with this presence and 
lowland influx, had unprecedented contact with the outside world. Yet 
many of these communities in their scattered mountain valleys and up 
the slopes had little direct involvement with the Han and continued 
their internal evolution. Within the Han province on the east, 
especially along the trade routes and in the major valleys (Kunming, 
Dali, etc.), there was significant impact as Chinese prestige goods 
entered the region, especially on the local elites and consequently the 
social hierarchy. Walled settlements sprang up there during this 
period. Yet, however entangled they were with the Han framework, the 
dong societies maintained a cultural continuity, and outside the 
limited areas of the Han administrative centers and their direct contact 
with local communities, the dong peoples continued in their bare feet 
and houses on stilts (as the Chinese viewed them).1 
 The Han disruption of dong communities at major locations, 
especially in the east, left the many river valleys of the mountains 
oriented to a greater or lesser degree to the new social and economic 
patterns. Through the first centuries CE and with the disappearance of 
the Han presence (along with their dynasty) in the third century, the 
dong communities emerged in a scattered and looser relationship with 
each other. The Cuan Clan2 in the eastern sector of the Dong World, 
the region most affected by Han penetration, was strongly influenced 
                                                          
1 Yao (2016:182-214) and Henry Wright (personal communication, 11 
November 2016). 
2 The Cuan formed the Nanzhong daxing 'Great Clan of Nanzhong' in an area 
comprised of China's modern-day southern Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan 
provinces. 




by the Han presence, but was once again re-rooted in its mountain 
valleys. Hierarchy in the Dong World tended to be interrelated with 
the degree of external contact and exposure, specifically regarding 
locations in the mountains relative to the communication routes. 
Using both archaeological works and Chinese texts, Churchman 
(2011/2013; 2015; 2016) takes us to the far eastern side of the Dong 
World in these centuries. Here, on the edge of the mountain territory, 
dong communities benefited from their external contacts, both in 
status and in wealth, and manipulated the routes through their valley 
territories to their advantage. In addition, local production of precious 
metals, including copper and gold (in Guangxi and Cao Bằng), and 
forest products enriched these dong communities further. Building on 
their indigenous culture, these local societies gained from this wealth 
available to them. One result was that their bronze drums were locally 
produced with their own style of manufacture and distinctive design 
patterns, utilizing both their own copper and Chinese cash. All this 
existed on the wet rice agricultural base of the dong and their 
mountain streams.1 
But the Chinese of these centuries retained little sense of the 
Dong World. Here we turn mainly to the Chinese texts. In the sixth 
century, Li Daoyuan compiled his zhu 'commentary' on the earlier Shui 
jing 'Water Classic' (third century CE). Looking at the river systems of 
this mountainous region as the Chinese perceived them, Li sought to 
describe the peoples there, reaching back to tropes employed by earlier 
chroniclers such as the scholar, Sima Qian (145-86 BCE). These 
peoples all appeared quite mysterious, and Li could only conceive of 
them in terms of magic and danger. Supernatural forces in animal 
form had power that humans had to appease and try to bring into their 
own hierarchy. This situation reflects the constant lowland/highland 
struggle. Avoiding such co-optation and standing apart from the 
lowland structure, the spirits (and the peoples) stubbornly insisted on 
their own ways of life. This Chinese view mainly concerned the eastern 
segment of the Dong World in which they saw scattered settlements 
                                                          
1 Yao (2016:ch 7) and Churchman (2011/2013:74-78; 2015:61-67; 2016:ch 
6).  




with chiefs who were "arrogant and licentious" (Taylor 1995:33) 
attacking the lowlands. They sat astride a trade route to India. At best, 
these mountain peoples would guard the frontier for the Chinese. 
Beyond this eastern sector lay territory even less known, far beyond 
Chinese knowledge and influence, none of it deserving any great 
degree of Chinese attention.1 
 Three centuries later, the situation in the Dong World and the 
Chinese knowledge of it had changed completely. The Man shu 'Book 
of the Southern Barbarians' appeared in the late ninth century, 
written by Fan Chuo, an official in the Annan Protectorate of the Tang 
Dynasty (in the lower Red [Hồng]) River) during the 860s. Having had 
direct contact with invaders out of the Dong World (Nanzhao), Fan 
provided extensive detail on both the western and eastern sectors of 
this area that was now of great interest to the Chinese. He described a 
region made up of chuan dong 'stream valley communities' or just 
chuan 'streams'. Indeed, this book is a detailed examination of the 
many chuan and their interactions.  
These multiple chuan dong were settlements based on wet rice 
cultivation, many of which were linked to trade routes through the 
mountains and over the passes. They were constantly competing and 
fighting with each other. Led by their chiefs (guizhu 'Spirit Lords')2 
and protected by the fierce topography, climate, and wildlife, these 
chuan dong communities flourished in their highland valleys. The 
Man shu described them in these terms: cultivating wet rice in their 
irrigated fields (the soil being "rich and fertile" [Fan Ch'o 1961 
[860s]:18, 53]), living in houses on stilts above their animals and 
surrounded by gardens, and growing millet, barley, and wheat between 
the rice harvests or up the slopes. Sources of salt were important, and 
a variety of fruits grew in the valleys and the mountainsides. Woods 
and bamboos were plentiful. Access to precious metals and horses 
provided wealth, as did the forest products and the commerce along 
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the routes throughout the Dong World. The Chinese noted that 
everyone in these dong communities went barefoot and wore felt with 
locally-distinctive headgear. These were ranked societies with 
sumptuary rules, from the farmers to the chiefs ("Spirit Lords") on up 
to the Great Spirit Lord himself, the Meng Clan of Nanzhao (see below). 
All adult males served in military operations, equipped with 
rhinoceros hide shields, bamboo spears, and especially prized 
Nanzhao swords. Overall, Chinese influences appeared, particularly in 
the eastern sector. The latter buried their dead, where the western 
sector cremated theirs (an undoubtedly Buddhist influence).1 
 Three centuries later, back on the eastern edge of the Dong 
World during the 1170s, two regular Chinese provincial officials in 
Guangxi province, Fan Chengda and Zhou Qufei, provide us with a 
description of the dong communities there.2 Theirs was the last major 
description of the Dong World before the Mongol invasions less than a 
century later, beginning in the 1250s. These officials began with the 
rugged topography, the precipices and caverns in the limestone karst 
countryside, and proceeded to give a detailed account of the great 
variety of fauna and flora across this mountain landscape. In an age of 
decreased political threat, the officials explicitly pointed out that the 
peoples there formed a lesser part of this grand landscape in their dong 
communities. These communities were predominantly Tai, led by 
clans named Nong and Huang,3 Mo and Wang. Presenting them as 
"fierce and ferocious … preposterous and strange" (Fan Chengda 2010 
[1170s]:150, 161), the officials once again depict the dong communities 
as growing rice together with a great variety of garden produce, fruit 
trees in their valleys, and gathering other resources in the mountains 
surrounding them. Living in their houses on stilts above their many 
animals, these peoples also manufactured goods and took part in trade, 
dealing in horses and metals. They dressed in felt, but now at least 
                                                          
1 Fan Ch'o (1961 [860s]:67-82). These economies had, together with millet 
and barley, various tree and root crops as key elements in their agriculture 
(Henry Wright personal communication, 11 November 2016). 
2 Fan Chengda (2010 [1170s]:ch 13).  
3 For more on the Huang Clan, see Anderson (2014). 




some had footgear. Social structure was local with the chiefs, elites, 
farmers, and war captives. Local military forces entrusted with the 
defense of the region were armed with shields, crossbows, spears, and 
swords. 
 Unlike Fan Chuo, these two officials also mentioned upland 
peoples in the mountains above the valleys. Those in the northern 
region of the Dong World, called Yao, were less economically stable in 
their upland fields, even coupled with hunting and gathering, and thus 
posed a threat to those in the valleys.1 Raiding and trade (in mountain 
products for salt and rice) sustained them. On the slopes to the south, 
generally beyond Chinese knowledge, were peoples called mountain 
Lao (no relation to the present Lao of Laos) hunting and gathering with 
some control over the horse trade routes. As with the earlier Shui jing 
zhu, fantastic tales enveloped these upland peoples. And looking 
westward beyond these territories stretching to Tibet lay the dong 
communities of the "true Southern Barbarians" (Fan Chengda 2010 
[1070s]:182), still barefoot. Despite a general ignorance of the area Fan 
Chuo had described in such detail, these two officials did recognize the 
autonomy of the societies there. The horse trade was quite important, 
and all carried swords, with those from Dali (the old Nanzhao) 
especially valued. 
 While these dong communities appeared distant and isolated 
from the lowlands, they would, as Richard O'Connor (1995:968-96) 
pointed out, have an immense impact on the societies and economies 
of mainland Southeast Asia. He argues that out of the highland dong 
valleys it seems there came an "agro-culture" system of irrigated wet 
rice that emerged into the lowlands of the Irrawaddy, Chao Phraya, 
Mekong, and Red Rivers. Within the mountain valleys, the people (Tai, 
Tibeto-Burman) had developed irrigated wet rice agriculture by 
manipulating the rapid flow of the valley streams (the chuan, as the 
Man shu called them). With the agricultural system, there came 
concomitant ritual and ethnic change, as the new system drew other 
peoples into it. In this way, O'Connor argues, peoples either within or 
immediately adjacent to the Dong World (Burmans, Thai, and 
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Vietnamese) brought this agro-cultural system with its weirs and water 
control onto the plains of their major river valleys. There, they 
established socio-economic systems on this agricultural and ritual 
basis, which were able to overcome the tank agro-cultural systems of 
the existing Pyu, Mon, Khmer, and Cham peoples to their south. 
Thereby, the socio-economic patterns forming within the dong valleys 
led to more efficient and productive forms than had developed in the 
lowlands of the Southeast Asian mainland. Led by their chieftains, 
these dong societies became cooperative and structured, bringing 





 Among the multitude of dong communities scattered across the 
mountain terrain of this world, what political relations existed within 
and between them? Based on the wet rice production of their valleys, 
large and small, supplemented by trade, the strength of these 
communities depended on both the extent of their resources, human 
and material, and the human capability of forging relations/alliances 
with, or dominating, other communities. 
 As the socio-economic nature of the Dong World continued 
through the centuries, affected to some degree by trade and contact 
with the external lowlands, its political structure changed with the ebb 
and flow of encroaching state power from surrounding regions. The 
rise of chiefdoms with their bronze drums in the dong communities 
emerged from the mountain valleys and culminated in the great 
lordships of Nanzhao and Dali. Through the last millennium BCE, per 
Alice Yao's study of excavated local cemeteries, there occurred "a new 
political time" (2016:103). She sees in the first half of the millennium 
the formation of dong communities with the "emergent territorial 
politics" (2016:20) and competition. This was followed by the rise of 
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the bronze drum chiefdoms in the fifth to third centuries BCE as trade 
involving both valleys and upland slopes brought wealth to the valleys. 
This culminated during the third century BCE with the Dian lordship 
before the Han Dynasty pressure brought Chinese domination to the 
eastern sector of the Dong World. At this point, dong chieftains 
utilized Han contacts to strengthen their positions locally. 1  A 
corresponding Han court campaign to extend direct communications 
into the Dong World through extensive road building failed due to 
excessive costs, and most areas of the Dian kingdom remained beyond 
direct Han contact.2 
 With the growth of the dong communities in the stream valleys 
among the mountains, the graves reveal in the early centuries the rise 
of the chiefs and, in Yao's words (2016:103), "war and territorial 
battles" among the valleys throughout the Dong World. Warriors 
became significant with the thriving competition across the eastern, 
central, and western territories, with no one valley dominating. By the 
middle of the millennium, the bronze culture was developing strongly, 
and with it, the linking of drums with chiefdoms, from the high valleys 
to the eastern coastal lowlands. This marked, in Yao's phrase 
(2016:126), "a different order of political time" as dong chiefs raised 
their status socially as well as politically, utilizing elements from the 
Sichuan culture to the north. Resources and leadership differentiated 
these dong communities in their power relations. During this "wider 
political time" (Yao 2016:131), there arose the Dian lordship in the 
Kunming plain which came to dominate the eastern sector of the Dong 
World by the third century BCE, taking advantage of the flow of goods 
along the mountain routes and controlling the chiefdoms' access to it. 
This Dian realm consisted of alliances and control among the 
dong communities as its influence spread, setting the stylistic example 
for ritual and ceremony for the other valleys. Horses and the hunt 
began to stand out. Local chieftains used their Dian contacts to 
enhance their own authority. Here we see a great elaboration in the 
ritual use of bronze drums and cowrie-containing kettles within the 
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Dian lordship, particularly the widespread use of drums. The dong 
chieftains, continuing their local traditions, adhered to the Dian 
lordship and its patterns. Defining themselves in relation to it, they 
undoubtedly sharpened their own definitions of themselves.1  
 From the third century BCE into the second century BCE, Qin 
and Han entrance into this eastern sector of the Dong World strongly 
affected both the Dian lordship (which eventually disappeared) and 
the dong chieftains. With the Han invasion of 109 BCE, elements of 
prestige and authority now began to be derived from the Chinese 
imperial system based in the Kunming plain in the east and extending 
west to the Dali plain. The dong communities generally maintained a 
continuity with their own pasts, resisting the Chinese effort at cultural 
domination. But the allure of imperial glory and the friction with its 
demands motivated and defined the dong chieftains' actions, even 
those in the western Dong World beyond the reach of the Han. Local 
lords, those of Dian and Pu Han, became allied with the Han court, 
receiving seals and imperial confirmation of their status. What was, in 
Yao's (2016:168, 181) phrase, "an upended Bronze Age political time" 
when "a sense of regionalism was reworked," saw the strengthening of 
local dong chieftains as they became yishuai 'barbarian chiefs', 
adapting to the greater Chinese influence. Iron spears and crossbows 
came to be major weapons adopted locally, no doubt from locals 
serving in Chinese armies.2 
The Han thus allied with the local structure of the mountain 
valleys. Taking advantage of what the Han imperial system had to offer, 
dong chieftains in this eastern sector (no doubt followed by those in 
the west) applied the knowledge they gained to consolidate their own 
local situations. After more than a century of increasing Chinese social 
and economic presence in the region, a massive rising in 42 CE (at the 
same time as one in the present northern Vietnam) shook the Chinese 
hold. This Han domination had disrupted local Bronze Age patterns, 
and there followed a blending of the Sinitic features with ongoing local 
patterns to form valley chiefdoms of a different sort, able to deal more 
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effectively with outside powers. With this new form of local leadership, 
competition increased among the many dong communities. Operating 
within what Yao (2016:225) terms "a different juridical-political 
space" from either the Bronze Age or the Han imperial eras, these 
yishuai utilized both indigenous bronze drum traditions and Chinese 
elements (like seals) to establish their local authority, proving their 
ability to lead their dong as they engaged the outside world.1 
 The Shui jing zhu shows us the general Chinese ignorance of 
local politics in the Dong World from the dissolution of the Han empire 
during the second and third centuries CE through the sixth century, 
particularly of its western sector. Generally, yishuai (and in particular 
Cuan clans and their "Spirit Lords" [guizhu] in the eastern sector) 
thrived in the mountain valleys, especially after Zhuge Liang's third 
century campaign (225 CE) into the eastern sector from Sichuan. Yet 
tales within the Shui jing zhu reflected a deep respect of the Chinese 
for the indigenous powers of the Dong World, seen in the form of 
spirits and supernatural animals. Difficult to tame and bring under 
some sort of control, the many dong powers continued to thwart 
Chinese efforts to put them in their proper place. They threatened 
imperial expansion and sat across the overland trade routes.2 We can 
see this in Churchman's studies (2011/2013; 2015; 2016) on the 
eastern edge of the Dong World.  
Here, in the new situation of the yishuai (now lishuai), local 
chieftains in their dong valleys developed their new pattern of bronze 
drum leadership. This new form capitalized on their trade, on the 
resulting economic wealth, and on external contacts to enhance their 
local competitive edge against both other dong chiefdoms and the 
Chinese realms (Jin, Liu-Song, Liang, Qi, and Chen) attempting to 
control them. Focusing on their drums, the lishuai (locally called 
dulao),3 "extremely powerful and heroic" (Churchman 2011/2013:76; 
2015:63; 2016:68) in a contemporary Chinese description, increased 
their authority, organized their societies within their dong valleys, and 
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led them against other dong as well as the encroaching Chinese forces. 
These centuries appear to have seen the formation of the ruling ‘clans' 
(entourages) bearing Chinese surnames (Huang, Nong) around the 
chieftains (Holm 2003:167-68). At times, such action might involve 
the forces of numerous allied dong, on occasion perhaps those of a 
single dong. Chinese texts record numbers from a few soldiers to many 
thousands. Indeed, local Chinese officials began to take on dong 
characteristics as they worked to control their territories.1 
 With first the Sui,2 then the Tang dynasties in the late sixth and 
early seventh centuries, Chinese imperial power began to press into the 
Dong World anew, particularly in the east. The Guangxi territory 
described by Churchman came to be strongly dominated by the new 
imperial administrative structure. This brought an end to the 
chiefdoms there and their bronze drum leadership. They were replaced 
by imperial symbols of authority and jimi 'halter and bridle' alliances 
with the Chinese. 3  Simultaneously, Sui and Tang forces were 
destabilizing the Cuan dong chiefdoms in the eastern sector, a bit to 
the west of the area Churchman has described. One Sui Dynasty 
expedition (597) penetrated the central Dong World, defeating over 
thirty dong chiefdoms. Disrupted by the Sui, the Cuan territories were 
then throttled by the Tang. Dealing first with the Cuan on the east, the 
Tang then pushed into the western sector, causing jimi alliances to 
form there. After a quiet period, the 640s and 650s saw the Tang push 
farther into the western sector in an effort to open the road to India for 
themselves. This led to local resistance and a major Tang response. 
Over seventy dong led by their Spirit Lords in the western sector 
submitted and allied with the Tang, including the Meng, a clan on the 
southwestern edge of the Chinese advance. In the process, the Cuan to 
the east had weakened and become targets of this rising power to the 
west, the Meng Clan of Nanzhao (see Fig. 2).4  
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 The Tang disruption of the eastern and central sectors of the 
Dong World allowed dong clans farther to the south and west to benefit 
from the Chinese actions and the resulting local power vacuum. The 
Meng Clan of the Nanzhao 'Southern Realm of six (or eight) Lordships', 
farthest from the Tang incursion, took advantage of the situation. 
Utilizing their contacts with the Tang and their dong leadership, the 
Meng moved from chieftain ("Spirit Lord") to overlord ("Great Spirit 
Lord") during the following two and a half centuries. We see this in 
great detail in Fan Chuo's late ninth century Man shu. Having become 
an equal player with the Tang and the Tubo court of Tibet, Nanzhao 
strove to dominate the Dong World from its far southwestern locale, 
requiring Chinese attention as exemplified in the Man shu. From the 
mid-seventh century to the mid-eighth, this dong clan worked with the 
Tang against Tibet and other local threats and gradually came to 
control the adjacent five (or seven) other major dong in their vicinity 
before moving east against the weakened Cuan.  
The second half of the eighth century, following the great An 
Lushan rebellion of the 750s against the Tang, saw Nanzhao join the 
Tubo to challenge the Tang hold within the Dong World, before 
rejoining the Tang in the 790s against the increasingly aggressive Tubo 
and broader Tibetan designs. Nanzhao power culminated through the 
ninth century as it drove the weakening Tang out of the Dong World. 
Masters of their mountain domain, the Nanzhao Great Spirit Lords 
connected with the Irrawaddy valley and ultimately India, gaining both 
wealth and Buddhism. Becoming maharajas (with the Indic Abhiseka 
[consecration] ceremony) and Vajrayanists with a flourishing local 
form (using both Sanskrit and Chinese writing), the Meng lords of 
Nanzhao ruled a major realm within the Dong World.1 In the process, 
they undoubtedly spread such political authority and Avalokitesvara 
worship deeper into the Dong World and threatened lowland 
Southeast Asia in the process.  
While we have not pieced together a complete picture of 
Buddhism's introduction into the Dong World, we have found 
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distinguishing characteristics in the practices of Nanzhao and its 
successor, the Dali Kingdom. Henrik Sorensen (2011a; 2011b) 
observes that even though Mahayana Buddhist practices may have 
entered Yunnan by the late Han Dynasty (certainly into Nanzhao 
society by the seventh century) through Sichuan, and that Sinitic forms 
of Mahayana and Esoteric Buddhism (by the late ninth century) would 
take hold in both Nanzhao and Dali temple activity, "there are also 
many differences and anomalies special to the Buddhists of Dali." He 
concludes that "this indicates the existence of a flourishing local form 
of Esoteric Buddhism that was only partly under the influence of 
Chinese culture" (2011a:386). The reliance on spells, mantras, and 
talismans of all types and for many purposes is, in Sorensen's thinking, 
a distinguishing feature of Nanzhao and Dali Buddhism. The founding 
myth of the Nanzhao Kingdom is closely linked to the figure of the 
Bodhisattva Guanyin (Avalokitesvara), and Sorensen contends that 
this link extended into the Dali period.  
Esoteric forms of veneration are widely depicted in Nanzhao 
cave art and in Zhang Shengwen's pictorial 1173-1176 "Long Scroll." 
Could this esoteric veneration of Avalokitesvara be a feature of Dong 
World Buddhism, or is the worship of this well-known figure too 
widespread to be considered a distinguishing characteristic? This 
point requires further exploration. The Bai people's burial practices of 
the Dali period incorporated Esoteric Buddhist features not widely 
practiced in China at this time, including the placement of funerary 
urns in small schist coffins, inscribed with Sanskrit bija mantras and 
containing the deceased individual's personal effects.1 Chinese style 
funerary practices did not enter this region until after the era of 
Mongol conquest, which fits well with our periodization for the 
beginning of widespread political and cultural realignment. 
 Within the first decade of the tenth century, both the Tang and 
Nanzhao regimes collapsed and disappeared. We hear no more of the 
Meng Clan. In 937, the Dali realm, led by the Duan Clan, former 
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bodyguards of the Meng, arose, based in that western plain. Twenty-
three years later, the Song Dynasty unified China. Yet neither of these 
two new realms was as aggressive as their predecessors had been. For 
three centuries, until the Mongol invasions, they tended to co-exist and 
leave one another alone. It was predominantly the Song need for 
horses that required any contact, especially for the Southern Song from 
the 1120s on. The dong communities continued their local rivalries, 
with many bound to the new ruling Duan Clan, despite the latter's 
reduced and cautious stance.  
Strongly Buddhist now, the Duan moved in 971 to extend their 
local power by joining clans of thirty-seven dong chiefdoms in the 
eastern sector together in a broad alliance (as recorded in a local stone 
inscription). In this way, the Duan kept the Dong World generally 
stable and the way east open for the horse trade. Later Vietnamese 
sources recorded Dali in the late eleventh century as the home of a man 
with magical powers.1 Earlier, in the mid-eleventh century, Nùng in 
the mountains north of Đại Việt, led by Nong Zhigao/Nùng Trí Cao, 
established their own autonomous Tai realm among the valleys in the 
eastern Dong World.2 
 For the two Guangxi officials of the 1170s, Fan Chengda and 
Zhou Qufei, Dali was a distant, little-known place. It was "extensive 
and its population numerous, and its weapons and arms extensive" 
(Fan Chengda 2010 [1070s]:225), perhaps reviving a memory of 
Nanzhao. They knew of the horse trade into their territory, but 
generally focused on their immediate surroundings on the eastern 
edge of the Dong World. In their territory, filled with dong 
communities and the clans that ran them (Nong, Huang, et al.), the 
Chinese favored jimi 'alliances' with certain clans of the local chieftains 
who garnered titles and material benefits therefrom.  
The chieftains in general directed the affairs, especially 
economic, of their dong and negotiated with the Chinese as they 
continued to compete with their fellow dong chieftains in neighboring 
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valleys (as well as within their own clans) for influence and manpower. 
Local feuds and conflicts among clans abounded. Much conniving took 
place, as chieftains sought to involve the Chinese in their own schemes 
against rivals. Backed by well-armed, tough local warriors, now with 
footwear and crossbows, these chieftains proved to be formidable local 
powers. Thus, into the thirteenth century, the Dong World retained its 
autonomy and activities (though not as active as in the Nanzhao era) 
and even on its eastern fringes remained pursuant of its own interests 
while being engaged with the Chinese imperial structure.1 
The political impact of the Dong World on surrounding regions 
was significant, particularly to the south. At the peak of its power 
during the ninth century, Nanzhao campaigns might have pushed 
down into and strongly affected communities in the valleys of the 
Irrawaddy (830s) and the Red (Hồng) (860s) rivers, as well as 
attacking north into Sichuan (820s, 870s). Well-remembered in later 
centuries by the Burmans and the Vietnamese, these highland 
campaigns caused major disruptions among Pyu and other peoples of 
the Irrawaddy hills and plain, and the Vietnamese and Tai peoples in 
the hills and plain of the Red (Hồng) River.2 Such activities helped 
open the way from the Dong World into the lowland plains of mainland 
Southeast Asia. Tai peoples, disrupted first by Nanzhao actions, then 
in the eleventh century by Nong Zhigao/Nùng Trí Cao's Tai realm and 
its defeat in the Dong World space between Chinese and Vietnamese 
domains, were willing and able to gain mutual advantage with 
neighbors and outsiders, and the chiefdoms practiced the art of this 
negotiation amid good or ill balances of power. In the last century BCE, 
the major Han presence had had a strong impact on the scattered dong 
communities, some greater, some lesser, especially on the east, but it 
did not last. Thereafter, into the seventh century CE, dong chieftains, 
now more experienced with external forces, developed their own 
strengths. Power in the Dong World had peaked with the Nanzhao 
realm of the Meng during the ninth century and had subsided to a 
stable level under the Duan Clan of Dali. 
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The major break in the balance of the Dong World came in the second 
half of the thirteenth century when the Mongol empire crashed into its 
midst as they sought to outflank and defeat the Southern Song regime. 
Straight through its mountainous terrain (and out the other side), a 
deeper penetration than any earlier strike, the Mongols captured Dali, 
ending Duan dominance, and, following Nanzhao, plunged down the 
Great Descent (Marco Polo's phrase) into the Irrawaddy and Red 
(Hồng) River valleys.1 In effect, the Yuan and succeeding Ming regimes 
split the Dong World in half, between the northern territory more or 
less controlled from their capital (becoming southwest China) and the 
southern territories (now northern Southeast Asia) eventually brought 
within the jurisdictions of Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. As 
the early modern states developed, they increasingly engaged the dong 
regions. 
 Throughout these mountains, the many dong communities in 
the highland valleys struggled to maintain their autonomy and 
freedom of action. Whereas in earlier centuries, those dong in contact 
with Chinese administration had allied themselves in jimi 'halter and 
bridle' relations, now contacts with external forces, especially Chinese, 
became more direct and controlling. Still the Chinese regimes were in 
no position (and generally had little inclination) to apply their 
standard bureaucratic procedures to the dong they could reach. The 
result was indirect rule, for the Chinese via the tusi, native officials 
appointed by the emperor (often in fact merely confirming a local 
chieftain). A step up from the prior jimi relationship, it still allowed a 
significant amount of autonomy on the local scene and indeed helped 
consolidate the tusi's local authority and control as he was now backed 
by the threat of imperial power. Over the centuries, as external powers 
north and south pushed to expand and define their jurisdictions, more 
and more of the dong chieftains came to have roles related to the 
lowland royal courts, whether in China, Myanmar, Thailand, or 
                                                          
1 Anderson (2015) and Sun (2015:193-231). 





 The tusi system developed within the Dong World over the 
next half millennium, through the Yuan and Ming dynasties into the 
Qing (thirteenth to eighteenth centuries). The system grew slowly as 
the dong chieftains and the northern administrative regimes adjusted 
to each other. When the Mongols came crashing through the Dong 
World in the last half of the thirteenth century, the Tantric Duan lords 
of Dali and the many dong chieftains in the mountain valleys had to 
adapt quickly to new circumstances and relationships. Being either in 
a large valley or on a major route, they were exposed to the direct force 
of Mongol power. Rejecting negotiations in the 1250s, the Duan 
eventually capitulated after coming under attack on three sides from 
Mongol as well as allied local forces. Becoming themselves part of and 
serving the Mongol machine, the Duan aided its further advances 
through the Dong World against Pagan (Myanmar) and Thăng Long 
(Đại Việt) in the southern lowlands. Overall, many dong chieftains in 
the Mongols' path chose either resistance and punishment (or flight 
deeper into the mountains) or alliance with the victors. Some not in 
the Duan power structure thereby took that opportunity to strengthen 
their own local positions.2  
 These latter dong chieftains became tusi in the Mongol 
commandery system under the auspices of newly-appointed Central 
Asian Muslim lords in what was now officially called Yunnan. The 
latter, Semuren 'non-Mongols' gathered during the great Mongol 
Eurasian conquests, stood between the new Yuan court of China3 in 
Beijing and these allied dong chieftains. Introducing the Sinitic system 
(schools, markets, etc.) into Yunnan's administrative centers, these 
Muslim lords set up the tusi positions to incorporate their new local 
allies into the imperial administration. These chieftains received titles 
and material benefits as they were expected to serve Yuan demands by 
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maintaining local order. Now part of the great Mongol order and its 
Chinese branch, yet generally left to their own devices locally for about 
a hundred years as tusi, the chieftains strengthened their immediate 
hold on power, cutting down on inter- and intra-valley rivalries. Their 
positions were hereditary and backed by the state power of the twelve 
provincial military garrisons. While dong resistance to this state power 
continued to exist deeper in the mountains and farther south, Yuan 
administration gradually extended more deeply into the Dong World 
and encompassed more dong communities within the imperial 
structure. Yet, as late as the 1320s, dong chieftains were telling Mongol 
officials to stay out of local rivalries and leave the locals alone – their 
affairs were of no concern to the Yuan (apparently with success).1 
 Deeper in the mountains beyond the Mongol reach and farther 
south stretching into the lowlands of Southeast Asia, the Yuan sought 
not tusi but xuanweisi 'pacification commissioners'. These were local 
chieftains and lords who would serve Mongol interests as guardians of 
the imperial flanks. They were not guo 'countries', but jurisdictions 
semi-attached to Beijing. The zone of such polities extended across the 
southern portion of the Dong World, that is, the northern Southeast 
Asian mainland, from Đại Việt in the Red River delta to Pagan on the 
Irrawaddy plain, and would eventually mark off 'Southeast Asia' from 
'China.' We can see these relationships among four major dong lords 
(chao), Sipsongpanna on the north, Lan Sang to the east, Lanna on the 
south, and Keng Tung to the west: Lue, Lao, Yuan, and Shan peoples, 
respectively. They interacted among themselves and with the lowland 
powers around them, becoming xuanweisi 'pacification officers' for 
the Chinese, while dealing with Ava, Ayudhya, and other lowland 
Southeast Asian powers.2 
 Initially, the Mongol movement through the Dong World had 
been a great shock to the polities on its southern side. As Sun Laichen 
(2015:195) points out, Mongol envoys setting terms on the local 
regimes were seen locally as "harsh, tough, haughty, and rude." At a 
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time (thirteenth-fourteenth centuries) when there were shifting power 
balances across mainland Southeast Asia,1 the Mongol shattering of 
the Dong World for the first time opened its southern sector to direct 
pressure from the Chinese empire. Nevertheless, the Mongol ability to 
control this far southern region was limited, and the dong lords 
realized that distance and terrain were on their side. For example, the 
Yuan Dynasty warning to an alliance of Sipsongpanna and Lanna not 
to attack neighboring dong got nowhere as the two realms' aggressive 
moves continued. Pushing southwest into the Irrawaddy plain, on the 
other hand, the Mongols had success. Yet, while Pagan now took part 
in the Yuan imperial system, the Mongols did not attain direct control 
over this court. It was simply too far.2 
 When the Ming Dynasty defeated and replaced the Yuan over 
the second half of the fourteenth century, Yunnan and the northern 
Dong World served as the last close refuge of the Mongols. As the Ming 
took control of this territory during the 1380s (including the still-
extant Buddhist Duan Clan), in effect they shifted this portion of the 
Dong World out of the great Mongol empire and for the first time into 
that of China. While continuing to utilize hereditary families of Muslim 
descent (Mu and Ma) to handle this frontier territory, the Ming 
bureaucratic system penetrated Yunnan (along with Han population) 
more deeply than had the Yuan regime and tied the northern Dong 
World more tightly to the Chinese state. Military garrisons sat at 
important points on the trans-regional routes. In the process, dong 
chieftains who accepted the Ming regime became tusi once more, but 
now, in Brose's description (2015:147), "within a three-tiered 
pacification bureau … staffed by native chieftains with Chinese clerical 
offices and overseen by the provincial Regional Military Affairs office." 
Drawn more deeply into the Ming state, the dong chieftains serving as 
tusi gained Beijing's confirmation of their local leadership, recognized 
by hereditary succession, titles, seals, official tallies, and imperial gifts.  
Divided into civil and military status, the former tended to be 
closer to Ming administrative centers and the latter deeper in the 
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mountains. The civil tusi offices were staffed by a mixture of 
indigenous and Han personnel who followed more standard 
government procedure; the military tusi were mainly indigenous and 
less tied to such procedures. Where the former supplied records and 
resources, human and material, from their localities, the latter 
provided troops and information. The Ming expected the two types to 
keep proper order in their domains and to guard against both nearby 
resistance and distant threats and to supply native troops when 
required. In David Holm's words (2003:171), speaking of the Zhuang, 
"[They] were ferocious fighters and had an unparalleled knowledge of 
a complex terrain with subtropical jungle, jagged karst peaks, and 
underground watercourses." They were protecting not territory per se, 
but resources and the routes and passes through the Dong World. 
Performing to Ming expectations, the dong chieftains serving as tusi 
had great autonomy. Protected from both internal and external threats, 
these chieftains became fairly immune to dong social requirements.1 
Through the first half of Ming rule, the royal court in Nanjing 
then Beijing, held the belief of tianxia 'all under Heaven' as one, under 
the Sinitic emperor. This included the tusi, as the Chinese felt the 
relationship between them to be close and only required exposure to 
the proper (Confucian) teaching. Unified in the human realm, the 
Ming court felt that dong communities along with guo 'realms' even 
farther south were not separate from themselves but linked all in one 
family. In the late fifteenth century, the Ming were bringing sons of 
dong chieftains into schools for proper education.2 Increasingly, from 
the mid-fifteenth through the sixteenth centuries, dong rulers began 
to shift their connections from the locality (as with the old Dali lords) 
to the Ming state. In one instance, a tusi clan utilized the Chinese 
literati pattern of compiling local gazetteers to ensure that their status 
and stance would continue.3  
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Yet, by this time, this Chinese attitude had begun to shift as a 
mood of separation and cultural distance was setting in. Why? The 
Dong World had demonstrated its intransigence and desire for its own 
autonomy. Four dong on the Sino-Vietnamese border had opted out of 
the Ming state and into that of Đại Việt. Huge battles had taken place 
for sixty years ending in the 1440s on the southwest frontier against 
Luchuan/Mongmao, the last successful effort by Tai (Shan) dong lords 
to establish a realm in the northern sector of the Dong World, while to 
the east there were Yao wars.1 The resulting sense of separation took 
the form of Chinese literati like Qiu Jun and Wang Yangming 
expressing distaste for engaging with these peoples and the need to 
keep one's defense up against them. One result was the construction of 
walls and gates to maintain just such a separation, internal as well as 
external.2 The tusi and other dong chieftains continued to pursue their 
own interests, not the state's.  
 These tusi, and scattered, non-affiliated dong chieftains, 
inhabited the larger northern portion of the Dong World cut out first 
by the Mongols, then incorporated by the Ming (eventually to be 
southwestern China). Farther south lay the band of xuanweisi 
'Pacification Commissions', ten of which extended all the way into the 
Southeast Asian lowlands, in less direct contact with the Ming imperial 
court, but which Beijing hoped to influence in some fashion. Such dong 
chieftains and local lords (primarily Tai who adopted the title 
xuanweisi [Tai, saenwifu] for their own purposes) in places like 
Sipsongpanna, Lanna, and Mongmao interacted with and played off 
the Ming efforts in their direction. But lowland forces now came not 
only from the north. State power was developing simultaneously in the 
plains of mainland Southeast Asia, Đại Việt in the Red River delta, 
Ayudhya in the Chao Phraya, and Toungoo in the Irrawaddy.3 Each of 
these three states was expanding its power into its northern highlands 
and contesting Ming dominance among the xuanweisi. In the fifteenth 
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century, Đại Việt first drove the Ming out of the Red River delta after 
their two-decade occupation, getting the above-mentioned four dong 
to join it. In the late 1470s and early 1480s, Lê Thánh-tông and the 
Vietnamese drove across the xuanweisi zone as far as the Irrawaddy. 
In the sixteenth century, Toungoo under Bayinnaung pushed out of the 
Irrawaddy plain east across this zone, into Lanna and the Lao 
territories. Eventually, Thai power would move north out of the Chao 
Phraya as well. All the way into the mid-nineteenth century, both 
northern and southern states would contest this southern portion of 
the Dong World.1 
 With this contestation, and as the Ming tended to back off from 
the challenges and dangers of the Dong World as a whole, this territory 
grew more unstable and open to numerous activities, anarchic if you 
will, at a time of climatic and ecological change that led to cooler, drier 
weather.2 Tusi seem to have become more locally powerful, supported 
but not interfered with by Ming officials. This possibly led to local 
corruption and oppression by tusi clans. Lying beyond tight official 
control, dong communities also became rife with heterodox thought 
and beliefs, refuges for those pursuing dreams and ideologies of their 
own making. Among these dreams were those held by deposed 
monarchs and their descendants, pretenders all. First there were the 
Mạc, former rulers of Đại Việt (1528-1592), surviving in the mountain 
valleys on both sides of the Sino-Vietnamese border through the 
seventeenth century and into the eighteenth. Then there came the 
remnants of the Southern Ming imperial court chased by the victorious 
Manchu conquerors across the Dong World east to west and into Ava 
territory on the Irrawaddy plain where they were captured and 
returned.3 
 The Manchu conquest of the Ming in the north opened the 
Dong World for both dong and southern external activities to thrive 
within the mountain valleys through the second half of the seventeenth 
century. First, it took years for the new Qing regime to gain control 
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over the tusi regimes, relying on former Ming generals, including Wu 
Sangui. Then in the 1670s, the latter resisted Manchu control in their 
Revolt of the Three Feudatories. When the Qing did control a dong 
community, they tended to continue the tusi clan autonomy, with only 
minor efforts at managing succession within them. In the meantime, 
the Qing were increasing the extraction of metals from the mountains, 
an activity begun by the Mongols and continued by the Ming. In the 
1720s, with a strong rise in this extraction and the new Yongzheng 
emperor's (r. 1723-1735) stress on bureaucratic control, there occurred 
a major change in policy towards the dong communities and their tusi 
clans. This was gaitu guiliu, which replaced the tusi with regular 
bureaucratic officials.1 In the strong belief that tusi clans were local 
tyrants harmful to the people, selling their land, and oppressing their 
dong communities, Yongzheng acted to end indigenous rule across the 
Dong World. In its place would be direct state jurisdiction and a 
sharper sense of what was considered Qing territory and where the 
frontier lay. 
 Such displacement of the tusi with Chinese officials had been 
occurring episodically for centuries on a minor basis. As the Ming 
backed away from the Dong World over the second half of their 
dynasty, this effort had slowed even more. Yongzheng turned this 
around in a systematic fashion. Now, and in the following centuries, 
the Chinese and the mainland Southeast Asian states all worked to gain 
such direct control, removing local dong autonomy in the process. 
Beginning from the mid-1720s for a decade, this Chinese emperor and 
his chief lieutenant in the Dong World, E'ertai (1680-1745), with the 
barbarian image firmly in their minds, strongly reduced the number of 
tusi across the region. Removed from government office, these dong 
chieftains melted back into the social fabric of their communities 
under the thumb of the local state bureaucrat.  
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This direct control now reached as far south as Sipsongpanna, 
much deeper into the Dong World than before, as gazetteers and maps 
recorded by the Qing made the territory more legible. Tusi still 
remained (and would do so until the mid-twentieth century), generally 
on the far fringes of the empire or deep in the mountain recesses. In 
the court's eyes, they served as warning fences against external 
provocations. While the gaitu guiliu effort slackened with local 
resistance under Yongzheng's son, the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-96), 
through the rest of the eighteenth century and continued raggedly 
during the upheavals of the nineteenth, it set the pattern for states 
north and south as internationalization and greater mapping took 
place. State competition required better demarcation and 
jurisdictional control. The dong communities would increasingly 
become caught within this competition. On the one hand, they could 
play different states off against each other for their own benefit; on the 
other, they could suffer and be overrun by more powerful external 
forces.1  
 Competition in this conflict zone began in earnest over the 
second half of the eighteenth century. The centuries before this had 
seen states strengthen in mainland Southeast Asia. As noted, Đại Việt 
played a vigorous role in the southern Dong World during the fifteenth 
century. In Ava on the Irrawaddy plain, Toungoo power had pushed 
into the Shan dong as well as across Lanna into Lao territories. This 
Burmese dominance lasted among the Shan and in Lanna through the 
eighteenth century and into the nineteenth. Burmese and Chinese 
state authority met and mixed in places like Kengtung and 
Sipsongpanna. The collision came when Qianlong of the Qing pushed 
his troops southwest into this zone during the 1760s and was badly 
beaten. In the 1780s, his troops moved out of the Dong World into Đại 
Việt and again lost catastrophically. In the nineteenth century, as the 
Qing weakened and were hammered by the British along the coast, 
their grip on the Dong World loosened.  
A new player in these mountains was now the Thai Chakri 
monarchy in their new capital of Bangkok. This aggressive realm took 
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Lanna out of Ava's claim, eventually absorbing it in the 1870s, and 
fought for dominance in Kengtung and Sipsongpanna within the 
northern sector of the Dong World. The middle of the nineteenth 
century saw anti-Qing revolts across the northern Dong World, the 
Christian Taiping (1850-1864) in the east, the Miao (1854-1873) in the 
center, and the Muslim Panthay/Du Wenxiu Rebellion (1856-1873) on 
the west. Then the century's second half had the British out of the 
Irrawaddy plain and the French from the Red River delta, cutting their 
way into the southwest and southeast flanks of the Dong World, 
respectively.1  
 Throughout this century and a half, from the mid-eighteenth 
century to the end of the nineteenth,2 the dong communities in their 
mountain valleys, near and far, individually adjusted to the forces, 
social, economic, cultural, religious, and political, constantly intruding 
into their territories. Dong chieftains, tusi lords, and those in the 
uplands amidst the growing chaos resisted or took advantage of these 
forces and continued to maintain their autonomy and agency as best 
they could.3 Upland peoples like the Khmu and the Hmong dealt with 
Tai chieftains in the dong valleys, owing them payments and labor.4 
With international borders imposed on them (in somewhat confusing 
ways; MacLean 2015:383) during these years and theoretically/ 
actually configuring their lives in ways often out of their control, there 
came the formation of borderworlds (in Mandy Sadan's phrase 
2013:45, 156-167). The dong inhabitants thus lost much of the agency 
and autonomy they had previously obtained. Having gone from the 
general period of alliance up into the thirteenth century, through the 
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half millennium of indirect rule of the tusi age (thirteenth to eighteenth 
centuries) into the increasingly-direct control of the gaitu guiliu era, 
the scattered dong communities in their mountain valleys have had to 
adapt to greater state control amid increasing external competition 
over the Dong World. The economic, political, and cultural forces from 
different directions have led to a mélange of local variations there. The 
increasing importance of imposed borders, though greatly porous, still 
tended to reduce and restrict cross-border interactions, sharpening the 
differences between the two sides.  
The political turmoil of the first half of the twentieth century 
both loosened external control (in chaotic times) and tightened it (as 
the lowland states asserted themselves). The Chinese Nationalist and 
Communist regimes, though taking different approaches, both sought 
to assimilate the northern dong communities into the Chinese nation 
and play positive roles in the formation of their own modern nation-
states. 1  Likewise in mainland Southeast Asia, forces working for 
independent and autonomous states saw their segments of the Dong 
World (as carved out by the colonial powers) forming part of the 
newly-recognized geo-body of their nations. Still the Dong World 
continued to allow for anti-state political and religious activities, as in 
prior centuries. The dong communities recognized by the British 
(Shan, Kachin, Lahu, Wa, et al.) on the southwest of the Dong World 
utilized this connection to maintain their authority in their own valleys, 
as the Communist Party of Burma also operated there (Smith 1991, 
especially ch 16). 
To the east in the mountains of the Việt Bắc (the northern 
mountains of northern Vietnam), the Dong World provided room for 
anti-colonial forces to operate and to join with local Tai dong 
communities (especially Hồ Chí Minh and the base for his Việt Minh 
operations that culminated in the great battle of Điện Biên Phủ, a 
major dong valley). Upland Hmong clans also became heavily involved 
in these struggles (Lee 2015). To the north, through the northern 
portion of the northern Dong World, Mao Zedong led the Long March 
                                                          
1 Hsieh (1995:324-25, 327), Mullaney (2011), Yang (1997:280, 285, 298-
303), Anderson and Whitmore (2015:40-42), and Winichakul (1994). 




of his Communist Party across Guizhou to establish their base in 
Yan'an. In this way, dong communities participated in significant 
political activities that set the future of every one of the soon-to-be 
national regimes of the region.  
 
 
TODAY'S DONG WORLD 
 
Since 1950, independent regimes have risen all around the Dong 
World and have sought to consolidate their portions of this world, as 
defined by the modern international borders. The peoples of the dong 
communities have had little to say in all these major events, however 
much they participated in them. Only in Burma/Myanmar have such 
dong communities continued to play a significant role in state 
developments. Many Hmong (Miao-Yao) joined US forces to oppose 
the lowland Vietnamese intrusions into their territory in Laos and lost 
in 1975. The Democratic/Socialist Republic of Vietnam (DRV/SRV) 
has worked to integrate the dong territories in its northern and 
northwestern mountains, while still battling the Chinese there in 1979. 
The Vietnamese joined with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 
following the Stalinist nationalities model to define the ethnic 
minorities, both upland and dong peoples, and to set up autonomous 
regions for them. Overall, across both the northern and southern 
sectors of the Dong World, state efforts to displace local rule by dong 
chieftains and to apply direct control has continued through the 
second half of the twentieth century into the twenty-first (see Fig. 3).  
 What was the nature of the dong communities and chiefdoms 
in the modern age? The French anthropologist Georges Condominas 
(1980) has given us a mid-twentieth century analysis of Tai muang 
(dong) across the Dong World. 1  Based on muang of the highland 
valleys, Tai communities centered themselves on the local spirit 
hierarchy, focused on the phi 'spirit' of the muang, with larger muang 
encompassing smaller ones in the political-religious hierarchy formed 
of shifting dong chiefdoms (chao). Expanding power (as O'Connor 
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indicated above) meant moving into other dong valleys and developing 
their wet rice agriculture and its related customs, while maintaining 
relations among the many dong, whether ally or rival (or both).  
The scheme was to create a network of muang (dong) lords and 
thus to dominate a territory and its routes (as in Sipsongpanna), while 
also integrating with local upland non-dong peoples. Out of such 
networks had emerged the muang overlords of Lanna, Lan Sang, and 
the Shan sawbwa (chaofa). Another report (Ma 2014:43-44, 47-48) 
has spoken of Dai chiefdoms in Yunnan having applied different types 
of "taxes" on the upland peoples as opposed to the valley (dong) 
communities. The impacts of the encroaching states have disrupted 
such relationships, first with the imposed borders, then with lowland-
derived regulations ("civilization"), resettlement, and re-organization. 
Such actions have greatly affected the dong social structure of the elite 
(mainly of the dominant clan), religious and political leaders in 
agriculture and war; the people of the rice paddies and soldiers; those 
in bondage; and the upland non-dong peoples from the mountain 
slopes under dong domination and being absorbed into dong society. 
 The 1950s and 1960s saw much turbulence, especially in the 
southern Dong World as the politics of the newly-established nations 
worked themselves out. The PRC and the DRV moved strongly into 
their claimed segments of the Dong World, the PRC throughout the 
northern sector, and the DRV in the Việt Minh base at the eastern end 
of the southern sector. Elsewhere, the central and western territories 
of the southern sector, mainly across northern Thailand and Myanmar, 
became a refuge and open area for migrants from the PRC (from both 
upland and dong communities, but mainly defeated Kuomintang/ 
Guomindang [KMT/GMD] troops) and for opium cultivation and 
movement (the Golden Triangle). Until they were all pulled out of 
these mountain valleys and relocated to Taiwan by 1961, the remaining 
Nationalist forces attempted attacks from the southern sector into the 
northern, often with the support of non-Communist lowland 
governments and the US.  
Even with the move to Taiwan to rejoin the Nationalist regime 
there, KMT/GMD villages have remained in this southern sector, in 




northeast Myanmar (especially Kokang, Shan State) and just across 
the border in far northern Thailand. There they (as well as the 
Communist Party of Burma) have often taken part in opium 
production and trafficking, providing protection for caravans 
throughout the Dong World, including within China. Some dong 
chieftains of varied ethnic groups, Tai, Kachin, Wa, and others, have 
joined them in these endeavors.1 
 These ethnic groups represent the movement of peoples, 
upland as well as dong, through the Dong World over the centuries. 
Tibeto-Burmans like the Kachin and Lahu, have traveled south into the 
southern sector and Tai like the Shan and Lue have moved west across 
this sector, while Mon-Khmer like the Wa have maintained their 
positions within this territory. This is particularly interesting for the 
previously-headhunting Wa who are apparently indigenous survivors 
in the midst of the Tibeto-Burman, Tai, and Miao-Yao migrations 
respectively out of the west, east, and north of the Dong World. The 
Wa to this day, have stood their ground across what has become the 
international PRC/Myanmar border. The Wa community and its 
orators have brought Tai (Shan) Buddhism into their political 
structure and to its lords. They have resisted other ethnic groups as 
well as British intrusions (in the 1930s), and over the past seven 
decades the surrounding states of the PRC and Myanmar, both 
politically and economically, licit and illicit in state terms. Though the 
gaitu guiliu has hampered the Wa in the northern sector, those across 
the border have staunchly resisted state intrusions.2  
 The dong chieftains and their communities in the southern 
sector have profited from the openness and its commercial 
possibilities in order to strengthen their local situations and to resist 
state advances from the lowlands into their mountain valleys. Violence, 
corruption, and clandestine trade have all played their roles in these 
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efforts to establish their local power. In the northern sector, the PRC 
gained control over the major dong chiefdoms, particularly Dai 
Sipsongpanna and its chao 'lord', formerly a pacification officer, thus 
cutting them off from Lan Sang, Lanna, and Keng Tung (respectively 
now in Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar) to the south.1 Existing in the 
Kachin and Shan States of Myanmar and Lanna, such modern dong 
chiefdoms have included Tibeto-Burman Kachin, Tai Shan, and Mon-
Khmer Wa and to the east in Laos the ill-fated Miao-Yao Hmong. They 
all have utilized their continuing frontier existence to keep their local 
autonomy against the lowland states, by any means necessary, through 
resistance, accommodation, or isolation.  
Pursuing their own interests in their highland valleys, well-
armed from their trade and/or opium profits, these communities and 
their chieftains have stood fast against state demands as best they 
could. With fellows of their same ethnic groups in the borderworld 
split off by imposed international borders, these dong communities 
can influence events in both China and Southeast Asia, as well as India. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of such upland and dong groups 
from Yunnan, with PRC encouragement and radio broadcasts in Shan 
and Kachin, supported their compatriots in Myanmar. The opium 
trade also had its impact in both countries. Thus, from the 1950s 
through the 1980s, it was mainly political matters, reinforced by local 
economies that fed turbulent developments across a great part of the 
southern Dong World.2 
 For the past thirty years and on into the future, it is the 
economic developments coming out of the PRC, led by Deng 
Xiaoping's new commercial policies, that have come to dominate the 
Dong World, north and south. The northern sector had seen, first, the 
PRC work to complete gaitu guiliu and to establish its cadre structure 
through the 1950s, effectively ending the "feudal" tusi system and 
setting up ethnic ("nationality" - the fifty-six minzu) autonomous 
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regions in their stead, with Deng Xiaoping significantly involved in 
these actions. Second, in the 1960s and through the 1970s, the radical 
activities of the Cultural Revolution and its Red Guards and sent-down 
youth permeated the major mountain valleys. Meanwhile, roads and 
electricity had begun to appear throughout this territory.1  
 With Deng in power, commerce and economic development 
came to the fore, producing far-reaching implications for the Dong 
World. In the process, the PRC has demonstrated that it now wants 
peace and stability across the southern Dong World in order to gain 
economic access. Just as the Han and later dynasties had realized, the 
PRC too (and with it specifically Yunnan Province) see the Dong World 
as an overland path to the South Seas (Nanyang) and to India, not for 
the valuables of yesteryear, but for those of today, primarily energy 
sources. For the dong communities, this has again presented both 
opportunities and threats.  
For the PRC, Yunnan and the Dong World at large have become 
not so much a barbarian "backwater" as a "bridgehead" reaching 
across the mountains through the dong communities to connect with 
economic forces on the far side. In this way, the decentralization of 
PRC's new socialist market economy has worked to open the 
commercial sector and thus the Dong World itself, both the Chinese 
northern and the Southeast Asian southern sectors. These past three 
decades have seen ever-increasing movement back and forth between 
the two.  
This period has also seen cultural recognition as well as the 
international concept of "indigenous space" for the dong communities. 
Occurring simultaneously with the Chinese state's determination to 
push through the Dong World to utilize the resources lying therein and 
beyond, it has resulted in greater possibilities for local effort and 
demands (Oakes 2004:287). The desired extraction and tourism has 
required major infrastructure construction, which has proceeded 
actively through the mountains. For Yunnan, this has meant, in Tim 
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Summers's words (2016:144), "a sophisticated road network, … 
growing aviation routes, communications infrastructure, and rail 
networks, and an increase in the number and capacity of border 
crossings." This includes highways to the ports of Bangkok and 
Haiphong (via Hanoi). Presently, the Chinese are also constructing a 
high-speed railway to Vientiane in Laos. The purpose here, in one 
observer's eyes (Strangio 2016:A8), is to make Boten in northern Laos 
"a transportation hub facilitating greater Chinese penetration …" of the 
southern sector.1 
 Even more important for the PRC is access to the West, to 
India, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, via the Dong World, the 
Irrawaddy plain of Myanmar, and the Indian Ocean. This requires 
stability in both the northern and southern sectors of the Dong World, 
so gaining the trust and favor of the dong communities is essential, 
hence the necessity for ceasefires with the upland and dong (minority) 
groups in northern Myanmar. Besides the transport network, there is 
the energy sector. This involves not only China as a whole, but more 
specifically the needs of the Dong World itself. The Chinese nation's 
economy and sustainability depend on access to energy, especially gas 
and oil, west of the Strait of Melaka. Development of the Dong World 
also requires it. This has taken the PRC into Myanmar's coastal oil 
sector as well as a port for supplies from the Middle East, all involving 
pipelines and their pump stations through the Dong World, south and 
north.  
Security for these pipelines requires peaceful relations on both 
sides of the border. Specifically, in the southern sector, this means 
ceasefires with dong chieftains of the ethnic minorities – Kachin, Shan, 
Wa, and even Han living there. In the northern sector, the provincial 
government of Yunnan has actively pursued these projects. Wealth and 
energy are spreading throughout the northern Dong World into 
Guizhou and Guangxi. In addition, there are hydropower projects in 
both sectors of the Dong World and the power lines for electricity 
distribution. Damming the many fast-flowing streams and rivers can 
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be both beneficial and damaging to local and downstream dong 
communities, due to relocations and disruptions to water flow. How 
this affects the centuries-long irrigation pattern of the dong 
communities needs to be examined. Increasingly, over these three 
decades, Chinese, particularly Yunnanese, enterprises have pushed out 
of this northern sector into the southern.1 
 With infrastructure development and the consequent increase 
in cross-border trade and investment, has come a rapid rise in tourism 
and "lifestyle migration." Many Han and other travelers have been 
moving into the northern sector of the Dong World and going beyond 
into the southern sector, as the latter has itself gained from lowland 
and foreign visitors. Looking for the exotic among the "authentic" 
upland and dong communities and the natural wonders of this very 
different environment, Chinese visits have led to the (re)construction 
of the imagined ethnic world portrayed in the multi-minzu 'nationality' 
view of the PRC. Indeed, the very ruggedness of the Dong World has 
drawn Chinese and foreigners throughout the mountain territory in 
trekking and climbing expeditions. Many Chinese have also sought a 
more pleasant life there than their lowland existences allowed. In 
addition, crossing the border, especially on day-trips into Myanmar, 
allows for pleasures (such as casinos) not available in the PRC and 
frequently shut down by Beijing. More important are the business 
enterprises and their labor force (out of Yunnan specifically and the 
PRC more generally) moving ever more deeply into the southern sector, 
together with a PRC renminbi cash zone forming there. Many 
businessmen, particularly in the extractive industries, make deals with 
dong chieftains, notably in the Shan and Wa territories. The Chinese 
enclave of Kokang has gained much in these activities. This Chinese 
economic penetration now extends across the entirety of the southern 
sector.2 
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 Moving north, another aspect of this thriving Dong World 
economic growth has been the narcotics trade. Based in the southern 
sector among upland and dong communities, this production and 
distribution has had a strong effect on the northern sector and on into 
China proper, where it has been seen, in the words of Steinberg and 
Fan (2012:269), "as an existential threat to the state." Opium 
production in the Dong World had developed strongly from the mid-
nineteenth century, with large amounts of supplies moving by caravan 
and railroad in the 1920s and 1930s. Heroin, and recently 
methamphetamines, have been hugely profitable for some upland and 
dong chieftains and have helped them strengthen their situations 
against state actions. The PRC looks to block this flow first in the 
western portion of the Dong World (Yunnan), then in its eastern 
portion (Guizhou, Guangxi), and finally along its southeast coast and 
in other provinces bordering the mountains. These anti-drug efforts 
have also led to PRC penetration of the southern sector, as it deals with 
dong chieftains there and uses satellites and drones for observation. In 
this, Chinese authority and power have gradually extended into zones 
of the southern sector considered threatening and dangerous to the 
PRC and its population. Chinese programs to provide economic 
alternatives to the narcotics production and distribution mean their 
further intrusion through the southern sector. The Chinese have 
pressured dong chieftains in Myanmar and Laos to cease their 
production and have also sought to educate local Chinese communities 
in the mountain valleys properly. Thus, the ever-watchful eye of the 
PRC, as in past centuries, has continued to try and determine events 
throughout the Dong World and to influence/control them in some 
fashion.1  
 Also moving from the southern sector have been influences 
emanating from the lowlands of the Southeast Asian mainland, 
particularly the Thai. From the first half of the twentieth century, 
Bangkok, changing the national name from Siam to Thailand, has been 
asserting its role as natural leader of all Tai peoples. Once seeing 
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Bangkok as a competitor with the highland dong lords, Tai in the 
northern sector of the Dong World now look to Bangkok and Thailand 
in general for an alternative view of the world. Though often resisted 
within the southern sector, the opening of the PRC border over the past 
four decades has allowed northern-sector Tai more exposure to 
Bangkok and its influences, seen in Shih-Chung Hsieh's (1995:328) 
words as "'a great and wealthy Buddhist country' … a respectable and 
proud brother country …" Theravada Buddhism is thus a major one of 
these southern influences, penetrating more deeply into the Dai world 
around Sipsongpanna. On the one hand, it reinforces the local tourist 
draw there; on the other, it might be seen as a separatist threat to the 
PRC minzu scheme. Buddhism, both Theravada and Mahayana, as 
well as Christianity, have also reached more deeply into upland 
communities like the Wa and the Lahu in response to modern 
intrusions.1  
 What has all this meant for the dong communities, north and 
south? For the states, as for Fan Chengda and Zhou Qufei eight 
centuries earlier, peoples of the dong communities have better 
contacts with the lowland powers and approach "civilization" in their 
highland valleys, unlike the peoples living up the mountainsides. This 
is especially the case with the Dai of Sipsongpanna who, according to 
Hathaway (following John McKinnon) (2013:61), "raised paddy rice, 
cultivated diversity-rich home gardens, grew their own fuel-wood in 
groves, and maintained 'sacred forests,'" and are thus more privileged 
than the highlands in the state's eyes. Yet many of the inhabitants of 
the northern sector of the Dong World, particularly those up the slopes, 
have seen major disruptions in their lives and their socio-economic 
relations. Various communities have been arbitrarily mashed together 
into single minzu and ranked against other such groups, another state 
aspect to be ignored or manipulated where possible.  
 Deprived of their guns and restricted in their hunting by PRC 
regulations, many of the mountain folk have become poachers and 
have seen an increasing lack of local autonomy under the eyes of direct 
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state cadre presence. In the process, socio-cultural patterns have 
fractured. For upland peoples like the Jinuo and the Lahu, severe 
dislocations have led to individual problems. Poverty has increased 
and alcoholism and suicides have appeared. Religious beliefs, 
especially Buddhism, have become a refuge, while some people have 
moved, seeking less accessible territory, even across the international 
border to join their ethnic fellows in the more open southern sector 
(northern Southeast Asia). Another aspect of this situation has been 
the shortage of marriageable Han women in the PRC at large. A result 
is the movement of females (Lahu, Kachin, and others), some out of 
the southern sector, by both legal and illegal means, into Chinese 
society. The narcotics situation has brought further difficulties among 
upland and dong communities.1  
In the southern sector, from northern Vietnam to northern 
Myanmar, both upland and dong communities have had to deal with 
the national configurations of each of their states. Whether socialist or 
not, these states place their "hill tribes" into subordinate categories. 
The peoples themselves take stands of their own - resistant, mimetic, 
compliant, or not - as they face the lowlanders and their particular 
capital. Myanmar sees strongly defined insurgent groups in the 
militarized and resource-rich hills and valleys of their Dong World. For 
Thailand, these peoples, more ignored than not, have to get the 
attention of Bangkok. In Laos, the distance between these peoples and 
the capital is even greater, while the Vietnamese maintain a tighter 
control on the dong valleys and uplands they claim, similar to the 
Chinese.2 Overall, in both the northern and the southern sectors, life 
has become increasingly problematic in many of its relations with the 
great lowland state intrusions.  
Thus, the peoples of the Dong World, in both the valleys and 
the uplands, have come to engage the modern world. Whether Tibeto-
Burman, Miao-Yao (Hmong-Mien), Tai, or Mon-Khmer, regardless of 
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their ecological circumstances, they have had to deal with intrusive 
state actions, increased international involvement, and the great 
technological advances of the age. Yet, as the volumes by Michaud and 
his colleagues (2000, Michaud and Forsyth 2011, Turner et al. 2015) 
so well illustrate, many of these peoples have applied degrees of agency 
in their actions and adapted their livelihoods to their new 
circumstances. While upland peoples have become increasingly and 
more directly involved in these activities, the dong and their valley 
inhabitants remain in key positions to vigorously mediate between this 
mountainous terrain and the actions of the outside world, negotiating 
and, where possible, benefitting.1 
 For almost 3,000 years in the Dong World, it has not been a 
question of openness to the outside world, but of the degree of this 
openness. Certain communities have been in closer contact, others less 
so, and some very little. By the twenty-first century, a stronger 
economic integration of the entire mountain region has taken place. 
Despite the imposed artificial international borders, the extent of new 
roads and rails, together with electronic connections, has meant a 
closeness for these dong communities that did not exist in past 
centuries. The state systems have intruded strongly, though not 
completely, especially in the southern sector where dong lords of past 
centuries remain in modern memory.2  Some dong chiefdoms have 
held onto their autonomy to a certain extent, while others have been 
overwhelmed and re-organized. Among the many highland valleys 
across this world of the dong, coming to grips with their internal 
organization in this changing environment and negotiating their 
stances within their particular states and towards neighboring states 
continues to demand constant awareness and flexibility. 
  
  
                                                          
1 Turner et al. (2015:136-140, 157-159) gives a good example of uplanders 
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Kao (2013). 




Figure 1. Map of the Dong World (Anderson and Whitmore 2015:4). 
 
 




Figure 2. Map of the Nanzhao Kingdom (Anderson and Whitmore 
2015:13). 
 




Figure 3: The Dong World landscape along the Sino-Vietnamese 
frontier (Xialei Township, southern Guangxi, James A Anderson). 
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